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Abstract. We empirically investigate the distributional consequences of the Riester
scheme, the main private pension subsidization program in Germany. We find that
38% of the aggregate subsidy accrues to the top two deciles of the population, but only
7.3% to the bottom two. Nonetheless the Riester scheme is almost distributionally
neutral when looking at standard inequality measures. This is due to two offsetting
effects: a progressive one stemming from the subsidy schedule and a regressive one
from voluntary participation. Regressions of the participation decision suggest that
a high level of household wealth significantly increases the probability of benefiting
from the Riester scheme.
Keywords: saving subsidies, retirement plans, income distribution
JEL Classification: D31, H55, J32, D14, I38
Giacomo Corneo
Freie Universität Berlin




School of Business and Economics
j.koenig@fu-berlin.de
Carsten Schröder
DIW Berlin/SOEP & Freie Universität Berlin
School of Business and Economics
cschroeder@diw.de
1. Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, governments have developed programs that provide financial aid to encourage
private saving for retirement purposes, especially among low- and middle income households.
Such programs complement public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems and are often justified
by the increasing difficulty of financing PAYG pension systems due to demographic change.
Germany - the first country in the world to have a national public pension system - introduced
its own program, called Riester scheme, in 2002. It promotes certified financial products for
retirement saving by means of generous subsidies and tax deductions. Basically, all compulsorily
insured employees in Germany, including public servants, are eligible for support under the Riester
scheme.
In contrast with its goal of inducing people to save more, the existing empirical evaluations of
the Riester scheme suggest that it hardly generates any effect on individual savings.1 That is,
the Riester scheme mainly displaces private savings from unsubsidized to subsidized assets, such
that the subsidies translate almost one-to-one into windfall gains for their beneficiaries. Thus,
the main economic effects triggered by the Riester scheme depend on how those windfall gains
are distributed – rather than real behavioral responses. If low-income earners were the main
beneficiaries, the Riester scheme would at least be likely to contribute to reduce old-age poverty
in the future. Hence, assessing the distributional impact of the Riester scheme is an essential
ingredient of a comprehensive evaluation of the policy.
At first glance, the Riester scheme is equality-enhancing. While the German PAYG system is of
the Bismarckian variety and relies on the equivalence principle, the provisions of the Riester scheme
entail distinctive elements of progressivity: a basic allowance that is equal for everybody and
generous child allowances that favor multi-member households. But in spite of those provisions,
the overall distributional impact of the Riester scheme is a priori unclear. Its opacity is mainly due
to the way in which beneficiaries self-select into participation in the scheme. Eligible persons are
entitled to the government’s financial aid only if they invest a certain minimum amount in so-called
Riester contracts, the amount being determined as a fixed fraction of a person’s income liable to
social security contributions. This boils down to requiring a minimum saving propensity in order
to be able to shift the required amount into a Riester contract. If the saving propensity increases
with income and poor households do not save enough to meet the participation requirement,
self-selection in the program will generate a regressive effect. Furthermore, high income households
have the possibility to opt for a special tax deduction provided by the Riester scheme instead of
receiving the full allowance. Whether the progressive effect from the subsidy provisions outweighs
1See Coppola and Reil-Held (2009), Corneo et al. (2009), Corneo et al. (2010) and Pfarr and Schneider (2011) for
analyses based on the German SOEP and the SAVE dataset. Strong displacement effects are often found also
for similar programs in other countries. Engen et al. (1996) provide a plethora of arguments why the supposed
stimulation effects of 401(k)s and IRAs are overstated or non-existent. A more recent example is Chetty et al.
(2013) who find in the case of Denmark that each 1$ of government expenditure on saving subsidies increases
savings by 1 cent.
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the regressive effect from self-selection and tax deductions is an empirical issue that we address
in the current paper.
Determining the distributional impact of the Riester scheme requires a dataset that is rep-
resentative of the German population and contains the necessary information to compute the
total subsidy received by each household. Such a dataset, the Panel of Household Finance (PHF)
was released by the German central bank in 2012. It is constructed along similar lines as the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in the U.S. Its key advantage over alternative datasets like
the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) is that the PHF records the amounts individuals
contribute to their Riester contract if they have one. We use that information in order to estimate
the benefit received by each household and determine the distributional effects of the Riester
scheme. A microsimulation model allows us to determine for each household whether it receives a
direct subsidy or a tax deduction. We carefully distinguish between tax unit - which is key for
determining the type and level of the subsidy - and household - which is the reference unit for
the distributional analysis.
Our main results are as follows. First, we find that about 38% of the subsidies accrue to
the top quintile of the income distribution, while only about 7% accrues to the lowest quintile.
Second, we find that the effect from the progressive schedule of the subsidy is almost exactly
offset by the regressive effect from self-selection into the program. As a result, measures of overall
income inequality like the Gini coefficient are hardly affected by the Riester scheme. Its effect
on measures of poverty is slightly worse, in particular on the share of the population below the
poverty line: the Riester scheme increases that share by nearly one percentage point.
The issue that we analyze in this paper is relevant for a number of countries beyond Germany –
countries with similar programs where participation is voluntary and behavioral responses are
small. So far, the distributional effects of these programs have received scant attention from
the literature. Important exceptions are 401(k)s – a type of defined contribution plan – and
individual retirement accounts (IRA) in the U.S. Burman et al. (2004) examine the distribution
of tax benefits from defined contribution plans and IRAs with data from the SCF and the SIPP
(Survey of Income and Program Participation). When considering both defined contribution
plans and IRAs, they find that 70% of the total tax benefit accrues to the top quintile and almost
none to the lowest quintile. These results are also robust to excluding IRAs. The pattern of
self-selection into the programs is close to the one we uncover for the Riester scheme: while only
3% of households in the bottom quintile participate, 41% of households in the top quintile do so.
Joulfaian and Richardson (2001) investigate the demographics of the population participating in
defined contribution plans, IRAs and other subsidized savings vehicles using income tax data.
They also briefly report on the distribution of the tax benefits along the income distribution of
wage-earning households. They note that the lower half of the distribution receives less than
10% of the overall expenditure, while almost 55% of the expenses accrue to the top 10%. When
restricting for eligibility for any of the subsidized savings programs the bottom 50% receive 20%
of the overall benefit and the top 10% receives 33%. Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004) use SIPP
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data to examine the impact of 401(k)-plans on wealth. Their findings indicate that the effect of
401(k)-participation is quite heterogeneous along the distribution; the largest positive effect is
experienced by those in the upper tail of the wealth distribution. Even and Macpherson (2007)
evaluate the impact of defined contribution plans on the distribution of pension wealth with SCF
data. They suggest that the switch from defined benefit to defined contribution plans will widen
the pension wealth gap between low and high earners.
We discuss our main empirical findings in Section 4, after having presented the institutional
details of the Riester scheme in Section 2 and our data in Section 3. In Section 5 we further
investigate the regressive effect from participation by searching for its main determinants. In
line with what Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004) find for the US, we find that net wealth has a
distinctive positive effect on the probability to participate in the Riester scheme.
2. Institutional Background
In Germany, any person in mandatory pension insurance is directly eligible to participate in the
Riester scheme. The eligible population comprises dependent employees, civil servants, persons
in vocational education, farmers, the unemployed receiving unemployment benefits and early
pensioners under some conditions.2 Individuals who are married to a directly eligible person and
are not permanently separated, are also eligible (indirect eligibility). According to estimates by
Fasshauer and Toutaoui (2009) from 2007, 71% (38.6 million) of individuals between 15-64 years
are eligible. According to Stolz and Rieckhoff (2013), 10.2 million individuals received direct
funding from the Riester scheme in 2010.
Beneficiaries receive allowances (a basic allowance and child allowances) and they can lower
their income tax liability by means of deductions. A minimum saving effort of the beneficiaries
is required. More precisely, the allowance and the personal saving effort must add up to 4% of
an individual’s income liable to social insurance contributions received in the last year (up to
a maximum of 2,100e). Both must be invested into certified financial products called Riester
contracts.
The minimum of the individual contribution is 60e per year. The funding is proportionally
reduced if the sum of the allowance and the personal saving effort is less than the required 4%.3
Within a tax unit, direct funding may only be received once – irrespective of the number of
eligible persons or number of Riester contracts. In 2010, the basic funding was 154e for singles
and 308e for couples with both parties eligible and participating. In addition, a child allowance
of 185e per child is granted (300e if the child was born after the 31st of December 2007). The
child allowance is granted if the child is entitled to the universal child benefits (Kindergeld).
2This refers to individuals classified as having a fully reduced earnings capacity (voll erwerbsgemindert). They
are recipients of a pension, based on their diminished capacity to work due to illness.
3Formally:
OCN = max (60,min (0.04× YLSC , 2100)−MDF ) ,
where OCN is the own contribution needed, YLSC is the income liable to social contributions, and MDF is
the maximum direct funding.
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The tax allowance is issued on the basis of a higher-yield test by the tax authority. The tax
authority deducts the amount of own contributions including the sum of direct funding (up to
a maximum of 2,100e for singles/4,200e for couples) from the personal income tax base and
calculates an adjusted tax burden. It then adds the amount of direct funding to the adjusted
tax burden and compares it with the regular tax burden. The difference between the two tax
burdens is the subsidy due to the tax allowance. The tax allowance is not applied if the difference
is negative.4
The sum of the direct funding received and the net tax savings due to the tax allowance, if any,
give the overall Riester subsidy. As an example, suppose a childless single earns yearly income
liable to social contributions of 60,000e and the tax rate is 50%. The tax burden before Riester
is 30,000e. The maximum subsidized saving amount is 2,100e, i.e. min(60, 000 × 0.04, 2100).
Therefore the direct subsidy with 1,946e of individual contribution is 154e. The adjusted tax
burden is (60000e − 2100e) × 0.5 + 154e = 29, 104e. Thus, the tax allowance amounts to
30, 000e− 29, 104e = 896e, and the overall subsidy is 154e+ 896e = 1, 050e.
3. Data
3.1. PHF and Tax Calculation
Our empirical analysis is mainly based on the Panel on Household Finances (PHF), a representative
multiply-imputed survey dataset.5 It covers the balance sheets, pension claims, savings, incomes,
work histories and demographic characteristics of households living in Germany. The first wave
of the PHF was collected in 2010 and 2011. Several variables were also asked retrospectively for
2009. Besides the surveyed variables, PHF provides 1,000 bootstrap weights to avoid problems of
unresolved or unknown distributions for test statistics. By bootstrapping the variance estimates,
users can rely on familiar routines for testing with (asymptotically) normally distributed random
variables.
The PHF contains information on the amount an individual contributes to a Riester contract,
but not on the financial support received by the same individual. We compute the subsidy by
taking into account information about the household context and by comparing the hypothetical
benefits from direct funding with those from tax deduction. Tax units are the reference unit
for computing the hypothetical benefit from tax deduction. To apply the income tax law and
calculate the complete Riester subsidies, we have constructed tax units from the PHF households.
Afterwards, net incomes and subsidies are aggregated over all tax units forming a household.
4Formally:
TAS = max (0, TBNoRiester − TBRiester) ,
with TAS the subsidy due to the tax allowance, TBRiester the tax burden with Riester tax allowance, and
TBNoRiester the tax burden without.
5See Kalckreuth, Schmidt, et al. (2013) and HFCN (2013) for details. See Appendix A.1 for detailed information
















































































Figure 1. Data Preparation and Microsimulation
Note. EStG is the abbreviation for the German income tax code.
Our technique of tax unit assignment is depicted in the first brace of Figure 1. Our assignment
method is equipped to deal with all household configurations of the PHF. There are two elementary
types of tax units: single adults and couples (with respective children). Single adults are treated as
complete tax units. Married couples are treated as a single tax unit, who files jointly. Non-married
couples are treated as two separate tax units. In multi-generational households, we draw on the
PHF relationship matrix to recover the above elementary types. Children are distinguished from
adults by eligibility for child subsidies.
In order to compute the tax liability we aggregate all the taxable incomes at the tax unit level.
One can verify from Figure 1 (second brace) that information on income from self-employment,
employment and other income is provided at the individual level and can thus be assigned directly
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to the tax units. However, capital income and income from renting and leasing are provided
at the household level. In households containing multiple tax units, assignment to each unit is
not straightforward because information on individual ownership of the underlying assets is not
available. To overcome that problem we exploit the information contained in another dataset,
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).6 In 2012 the SOEP asked individuals about the
distribution of assets within their household. SOEP thus provides the relevant information on
the within-household allocation of capital income and income from renting and leasing. We
transfer this information to the PHF through statistical matching. The criterion for a match is
the Mahalanobis distance measure.7 We calculate the Mahalanobis distance measure based on
certain covariates and assign a SOEP observation to each PHF observation according to this
distance.8
After the match is complete and the ownership percentages are assigned, data on ownership of
relevant assets is at the level of the individual in our dataset. Since the ownership percentages
from the match do not necessarily sum to 100% in each household, we perform reweighting to








where pijk is the percentage of ownership recovered from the match, k indexes the household, j
the tax unit and i the individual in that tax unit. Both the household level capital income and
income from renting and leasing are then assigned to the tax units according to the reweighted
percentages.9
The calculation of the income tax liability relies on an adapted version of the microsimulation
model STSM that was designed to calculate income tax liabilities for the SOEP.10 Since the design
of the PHF is very similar to the SOEP, adapting the STSM for the PHF is straightforward.11
6For detailed information on the Socio-Economic Panel, see Wagner et al. (2007).
7DM (x, y) =
√
(x− y)′CV −1(x− y) ,where (x, y) may be points or vectors and CV is the covariance matrix
of (x, y). We use the following variables in the calculation of the distance: household income variable to be
assigned, individual-level income variables, number of household members, age. We restrict matches to certain
slices of the data, wherein certain variables are in total agreement across matchable observations. These slicing
variables are: filing jointly, gender and geographical region (north, east, south, west). The match is performed
with replacement.
8The theory of statistical matching requires the two datasets to follow a joint distribution process. Then variables
missing from either one or the other data set can be taken as independent. Missing information then does not
play a role for matching the two datasets and matches are consistent with the joint distribution process. This
paradigm for matching datasets has been termed the Conditional Independence Assumption (D’Orazio et al.
(2006)).
9Thereby we implicitly assume that each tax unit earns the same return on the assets.
10 See Steiner et al. (2008).
11We detail exceptions in Section A.2.
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3.2. Descriptive Statistics
We investigate the redistributive effects of the Riester subsidy with respect to the overall population
in Germany and the subset of the population eligible for the Riester scheme.12 We are mainly
interested in the impact of those subsidies on the distribution of equivalent net household income.13
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Overall Population
mean std. error min max obs.
equivalent gross household income with trans-
fers without Riester subsidy
28957 450.756 850 324800 3565
equivalent net household income with transfers
without Riester subsidy
25274 334.426 518 221772 3565
number of household members 2.044 0.005 1 8 3565
marriedc 0.495 0.008 0 1 3565
agec 52.28 0.127 18 90 3565
femalec 0.350 0.006 0 1 3565
completed vocational trainingc 0.518 0.011 0 3565
completed extended vocational trainingc 0.178 0.009 0 1 3565
completed university degreec 0.135 0.007 0 1 3565
access to tertiary educationc 0.295 0.003 0 1 3565
estimated subsidies and subsidy rates
fraction of households participating in the Ri-
ester schemea
0.170 0.009 0 1 3565
level of Riester subsidyb 70.375 4.547 0 1764 3565
ratio of subsidy to net household income in % 0.184 0.017 0 17.111 3565
Note. PHF 2010. Own calculations. 1,000 bootstrap replicate weights used to compute standard errors.
a The participation variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether at least one household member currently
pays into a Riester contract.
b The sum of the Riester subsidies of all tax units within a household.
c Variable refers to the household head.
Our data show that 61.3% of households include at least one person who is eligible to participate
in the Riester program. The fraction of households with at least one participating individual is
17%. In weighted terms this means to 24,081,123 eligible households and 6,750,514 participating
households. The average level of the Riester subsidy per household is only 70.38e, but 36.7% of
12Results for the participating population are shown in the Appendix, Section A.3.
13To cope with outliers at the very bottom and top of the distribution and to limit biasing effects from multiple
imputation or measurement error, we employ 98% Winsorization. This entails setting incomes below the first
percentile (above the 99th percentile) to the value of the first (99th) percentile. See Hastings Jr. et al. (1947).
In the distributional analysis we will rely on needs-adjusted equivalent income. Equivalent income is household
income divided by the household’s OECD modified equivalence scale,
ESOECD = 1 + 0.5× (nadults − 1) + 0.3× nchildren.
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the beneficiaries receive a subsidy in excess of 500e. Riester subsidies may increase household
incomes by as much as 17%.
We use two criteria to determine the eligible population. First, households must contain at
least one Riester eligible person; second at least one household member must be below the age of
64. We impose the second criterion because older individuals had little incentive to enter into
a Riester contract at the time of the reform or after.14 Compared to the overall population,
the eligible population is younger, has more married household heads and higher income. The
fraction of households participating in the Riester scheme rises to 28% and the average subsidy
received is worth 115.94e. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the key statistics pertaining, respectively,
to the overall population and the one eligible for the Riester subsidies.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Eligible Population
mean std. error min max obs.
equivalent gross household income with trans-
fers without Riester subsidy
32168 644.275 850 324800 2106
equivalent net household income with transfers
without Riester subsidy
27533 454.152 518 221772 2106
number of household members 2.364 0.018 1 8 2106
married 0.538 0.013 0 1 2106
age 43.29 0.210 18 90 2106
female 0.311 0.010 0 1 2106
completed vocational training 0.545 0.013 0 1 2106
completed extended vocational training 0.177 0.012 0 1 2106
completed university degree 0.146 0.010 0 1 2106
access to tertiary education 0.330 0.007 0 1 2106
estimated subsidies and subsidy rates
fraction of households participating in the Ri-
ester scheme
0.280 0.014 0 1 2106
level of Riester subsidy 115.940 7.419 0 1764 2106
ratio of subsidy to net household income in % 0.303 0.028 0 17.111 2106
Note. PHF 2010. Own calculations. 1,000 bootstrap replicate weights used to compute standard errors. All
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Figure 2. Subsidy Level by Decile of the Overall Population
4. Main Results
4.1. Subsidization along the Income Distribution
Figure 2 shows the decile-specific average subsidy levels for the overall population in Germany.
Individuals are assigned to deciles according to their equivalent net household income before
Riester subsidies. We find that the average subsidy increases over the deciles and the increase
is sizable. In the bottom decile, the average subsidy is 23.56e. Up to the 6th decile, we find a
moderate increase of the subsidy level to about 56.83e. Over the top four deciles, the subsidy
level increases to 156e in the top decile.
By far the largest share of the total subsidy volume accrues to the upper part of the distribution.
This can be seen from the concentration curve in Figure 3. The concentration curve of the
Riester subsidy is the cumulative share of the Riester subsidy for the centiles of the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of equivalent net income.15 The concentration curve, unlike the
14According to Table 4 in Stolz and Rieckhoff (2013), only 0.06% of the Riester recipients in 2010 were born before
1946.
15Lambert (2001, p. 268 pp.) gives an account of how to construct concentration curves for subsidies.
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Lorenz curve, can cross the forty-five degree line, yet a concentration curve resting on the forty-five
degree line would still imply equal distribution of the subsidy among the population.16 We find
that about 38% of the aggregate subsidy accrues to the top two deciles of the population, while
only 7.3% accrues to the bottom two deciles.17 Hence, the Riester scheme mainly subsidizes
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Figure 3. Concentration Curve for the Overall Population
Note. This curve gives the cumulated subsidy volume channeled to the poorest x% of households, sorted by equivalent
household income before Riester-induced transfers.
4.2. Effects on Income Inequality and Poverty
In order to evaluate the redistributive effect of the Riester scheme, we now compute inequality
and poverty indices before and after Riester subsidies. Our distributional analysis relies on four
inequality indices: the Gini index and three members of the generalized entropy class, namely the
16To determine a household’s position in the income distributions over the five imputations we calculate the
average location of the household in the CDF of income and the average amount of Riester subsidy received.
17In Appendix A.5 we also calculate the decile graphs for other statistics like the average subsidy rate and the
participation fraction, which are computed analogously to the average subsidy level.
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Table 3. Effects on Inequality and Poverty
Overall Population
Measure woR wR− woR wD wR− wD
Gini 32.960 -0.014* 32.899 0.048*
(0.173) (0.002) (0.173) (0.002)
MLD 20.516 -0.025* 20.377 0.114*
(0.347) (0.006) (0.342) (0.009)
Theil 18.534 -0.018* 18.461 0.054*
(0.234) (0.002) (0.233) (0.003)
GE2 21.738 -0.029* 21.657 0.053*
(0.509) (0.003) (0.508) (0.004)
HCR 12.237 0.798* 12.052 0.983*
(0.166) (0.158) (0.196) (0.124)
IGR 35.589 -2.144* 35.692 -2.248*
(1.172) (0.382) (1.232) (0.291)
Sen 6.236 0.153* 6.145 0.244*
(0.205) (0.036) (0.202) (0.032)
Eligible Population
Measure woR wR− woR wD wR− wD
Gini 31.750 -0.031* 31.693 0.026*
(0.112) (0.003) (0.112) (0.003)
MLD 18.647 -0.050* 18.533 0.064*
(0.299) (0.008) (0.295) (0.010)
Theil 17.131 -0.035* 17.067 0.029*
(0.173) (0.003) (0.172) (0.004)
GE2 19.947 -0.046* 19.876 0.025*
(0.604) (0.005) (0.603) (0.005)
HCR 10.444 0.253 10.301 0.396*
(0.286) (0.167) (0.328) (0.117)
IGR 33.010 -0.875 33.030 -0.895*
(2.155) (0.491) (2.258) (0.344)
Sen 4.943 0.035 4.871 0.107*
(0.216) (0.037) (0.214) (0.031)
Note. PHF 2010. Own calculations. Statistical significance of the
differences at the 5%-level is indicated by *. 1,000 bootstrap repli-
cate weights used to compute standard errors. Standard errors are
displayed in parentheses. The measures Gini, MLD, Theil, GE2 and
Sen and their respective standard errors were multiplied by 100. The
HCR and IGR have been left as originally computed.
woR refers to the income distribution without Riester subsidies. wR
refers to the income distribution with Riester subsidies. wD refers
to the income distribution with demogrant.
Theil index, the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) and half the squared coefficient of variation
(GE(2)). These entropy measures imply different levels of inequality aversion, with the GE(2)
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putting the smallest weight on high incomes and comparatively the Theil the highest, with the
MLD lying in-between. Furthermore, we make use of three poverty indices: the headcount ratio
(HCR), the income gap ratio (IGR) and the Sen Index (Sen). The HCR is the percentage of
individuals under the poverty line, while the IGR gives the average relative distance to the poverty
line of poor individuals. Accordingly, HCR ignores the severity of poverty, while IGR ignores the
number of poor individuals, and both are uninformative about the extent of inequality among the
poor. Since the Riester scheme may influence all of these dimensions, we additionally make use of
the Sen Index, S = H [I + (1− I)Gyi<Z ], where H is the HCR, I is the product of HCR and
IGR, and Gyi<Z is the Gini coefficient for individuals with income yi smaller than the poverty line
Z. The poverty line is set at 50% of the median of equivalent net income in Germany. Without
Riester subsidies, the poverty line as computed from the PHF is 10,965e, while it is 11,007e with
Riester subsidies.
All our inequality and poverty estimates are provided in Table 3. Column woR shows the
statistics for the baseline distribution, the income distribution without Riester subsidies. The
adjacent column wR− woR gives the change in the index when the Riester subsidies are taken
into account. A positive (negative) difference indicates a regressive (progressive) effect of the
Riester program.
As shown by the upper panel of Table 3, the Riester scheme decreases income inequality.
Despite the subsidies mainly accruing to the upper part of the distribution, the Gini coefficient
and the GE-indices decline after taking the Riester scheme into account. The effects are small:
-0.00014 for the Gini, -0.00025 for the MLD, -0.00018 for the Theil, and -0.00029 for the GE(2).
The effects of the Riester scheme on poverty are ambiguous. The HCR indicates a rise in the
incidence of poverty by 0.798 percentage points; the IGR a lowering of the poverty intensity
by 2.144 percentage points, the most sizable reaction among the measures. These findings are
intelligible when considering that the poverty line rises while no subsidized person leaves the
poverty range. Individuals who now have fallen under the poverty line and those under it, who
are subsidized, are necessarily closer to the poverty line than before, causing the IGR to drop.
However, our “overall” poverty index, the Sen Index, increases by 0.00153, pointing out that,
while the effect of the Riester scheme on some of the poor is beneficial (as indicated by a lower
IGR), it is offset by the changes in its two other components (HCR and Gyi<Z).
The above assessment of the distributional consequences of the Riester scheme neglects the
fact that the income distribution without the Riester scheme is associated with an improvement
of the public budget equal to the total amount of the subsidies. The fiscal costs of the Riester
scheme are sizable: at the current rate of participation (17%) we estimate its total volume to
be 2,790 million e (SD: 180 mil. e).18 Neglecting the change in the budget allows one to avoid
making assumptions about the way the government would use the resources made available by
scrapping the Riester scheme. Now we consider a counterfactual where budget neutrality holds
18Stolz and Rieckhoff (2013) report the total of direct subsidies for 2010 to be 2,559 mil. e. Since the net gains
from tax deductions can be imagined as resting on top of the direct subsidies that households have already
received, we see rough agreement with our estimates.
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and public expenditure is shifted from the Riester scheme to a hypothetical demogrant. More
precisely, we assume that every household in the overall population receives the same amount of
equivalized subsidy (48.23 e), with no regard shown to eligibility for the Riester scheme. The
ensuing distribution (wD) is then compared with the distribution with the Riester scheme.19 We
view such a demogrant as a rough approximation of additional public expenditures on a vast
array of publicly provided services that are rather uniformly consumed by the population. The
same justification is usually offered when using a demogrant in theoretical models of income
redistribution.
The result of our analysis is displayed in the fourth column of Table 3. The Riester scheme
turns out to be less progressive than a demogrant. In absolute terms, these differences are about
two to four times larger than the baseline differences for the Riester scheme, wR− woR. This
shows that even an untargeted instrument like a demogrant – or a general increase in the provision
of public services – would redistribute income in a more egalitarian way than does the Riester
scheme.
The lower panel of Table 3 shows our results for the eligible population. As explained above,
the eligible population is younger, has more married household heads and higher income than the
overall population. It is thus no surprise that both inequality and poverty indices for the baseline
distribution woR are always lower. Because only eligible households remain in the sample, the
progressive effect of the Riester scheme without budget balance is stronger. The differences
wR− woR for the inequality indices are about twice as large as those for the overall population.
The differences for the poverty indices keep their signs, yet get smaller and insignificant. Part
of this result is due to the definition of the sample which leads to a relatively strong exclusion
of low-income households. Part is also due to the construction of the poverty line, which is
determined by the income distribution in the overall population. When using the demogrant as
the alternative tool for redistribution, our previous conclusions are confirmed, but the effects are
smaller in absolute terms.
To sum up, the Riester scheme has rather mixed effects on income inequality and poverty that
depend on the benchmark used for comparison. At first glance, this finding may seem to be at
odds with the results from the incidence analysis, i.e. that most of the overall subsidy volume is
channeled to the top of the distribution. But inequality measures are relative: equi-proportional
changes of income leave the measured inequality unchanged. Thus, a progressive effect may obtain
even if households at the bottom of the distribution receive markedly below-average subsidies.
Key for the distributional impact is not how the subsidy level varies over the various deciles
of the distribution but how the ratio of the subsidy to the income level (i.e. the subsidy rate)
changes along the income distribution.




To better understand the drivers of the distributional impact of the Riester scheme, we break







where si is the amount of subsidy received by each individual i with income yi and N is the
number of individuals in a decile. Let the members of the decile be ordered so that the first
M ≤ N participate in the Riester scheme and the remainder does not. Accordingly, we can




i=1 yi︸ ︷︷ ︸×
M
N︸︷︷︸× N∑Ni=1 yi ×
∑M
i=1 yi
M︸ ︷︷ ︸ (2)
= σM × µ × Y¯M
Y¯
. (3)
The intensity of subsidization among the group of the M subsidized individuals is captured
by σM . Participation is reflected in the participation rate, µ = MN , and
Y¯M
Y¯
is the ratio of the
average income of the beneficiaries to the average income of the entire decile. Thus, equation (3)
shows that the magnitude of the average relative income increase entailed by the Riester program
for a given decile can be decomposed as the product of three terms: the average subsidy rate of
those who participate, the share of participants within the decile, and the relative income of the
participants.
Table 4 provides all four statistics and their standard errors for each decile of the income
distribution. We first comment on the overall population. The subsidy rate of the decile, σ,
displays a non-monotonic pattern along the income distribution and exhibits relatively small
variations across deciles. As we saw in the previous section, this profile entails a small negative
effect on inequality if budget neutrality is neglected. In turn, this effect is mainly driven by two
opposing patterns concerning σM and µ. This is shown by the second and the third column of
Table 4. The subsidy rate of the beneficiaries, σM , is highest in the lowest decile and decreases
over the income deciles. The participation rate, µ, displays the opposite pattern, i.e. it tends
to increase over the deciles. As it turns out, in terms of overall inequality, the progressive effect
from σM slightly dominates the regressive effect from µ.
These results allow us to qualify our previous statement that the Riester scheme is an imprecise
tool for redistribution: participation increases over the deciles, explaining why most of the total
subsidy is channeled to the upper part of the distribution (Figures 2 and 3), despite higher subsidy
rates at the bottom for those who participate. For the eligible population the same basic pattern
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Table 4. Decomposition of Subsidy Rates
Decile Overall Population Eligible Population
σ σM µ Y¯M/Y¯ σ σM µ Y¯M/Y¯
1 0.449 4.982 0.077 1.160 0.712 4.652 0.147 1.038
(0.081 ) (0.599 ) (0.006 ) (0.043 ) (0.095 ) (0.313 ) (0.012 ) (0.034 )
2 0.215 3.166 0.066 1.021 0.505 2.749 0.182 1.013
(0.048 ) (0.292 ) (0.011 ) (0.011 ) (0.054 ) (0.125 ) (0.018 ) (0.009 )
3 0.280 2.153 0.127 1.020 0.610 2.132 0.286 1.003
(0.032 ) (0.108 ) (0.013 ) (0.007 ) (0.055 ) (0.136 ) (0.024 ) (0.004 )
4 0.294 2.049 0.144 0.998 0.493 1.742 0.282 1.001
(0.023 ) (0.131 ) (0.014 ) (0.006 ) (0.054 ) (0.130 ) (0.013 ) (0.004 )
5 0.324 1.914 0.168 1.007 0.507 1.489 0.341 0.998
(0.024 ) (0.120 ) (0.005 ) (0.003 ) (0.025 ) (0.055 ) (0.012 ) (0.004 )
6 0.242 1.286 0.191 0.984 0.417 1.352 0.306 1.008
(0.022 ) (0.069 ) (0.011 ) (0.003 ) (0.025 ) (0.062 ) (0.013 ) (0.002 )
7 0.318 1.312 0.243 0.999 0.328 1.085 0.302 0.999
(0.010 ) (0.051 ) (0.005 ) (0.002 ) (0.020 ) (0.056 ) (0.003 ) (0.002 )
8 0.267 1.187 0.224 1.004 0.423 1.261 0.336 0.998
(0.012 ) (0.038 ) (0.009 ) (0.003 ) (0.025 ) (0.035 ) (0.019 ) (0.004 )
9 0.298 1.272 0.237 0.991 0.402 1.323 0.305 0.997
(0.008 ) (0.065 ) (0.014 ) (0.005 ) (0.020 ) (0.058 ) (0.020 ) (0.003 )
10 0.247 1.098 0.225 1.000 0.337 1.068 0.317 0.996
(0.007 ) (0.044 ) (0.004 ) (0.018 ) (0.010 ) (0.038 ) (0.011 ) (0.018 )
Average 0.293 2.042 0.170 1.018 0.473 1.885 0.280 1.005
Note. PHF 2010. Own calculations. There are slight deviations from the formula due to rounding errors. Both
σ, σM and their standard errors have been multiplied by 100. 1,000 bootstrap replicate weights used to compute
standard errors. Standard errors displayed in parentheses. The row “Average” gives column-averages of the
respective point estimates. The decomposition does not apply to that row.
holds true. Accordingly, the trend in σ and the underlying causes of that trend are the same as
in the overall population.20
5.2. Drivers of Participation
If the Riester scheme puts cash on the table for the eligible households, why do so many of them –
about 70% – refrain from taking it? While a comprehensive analysis of participation in the Riester
scheme is beyond the scope of this paper, we close it by offering an econometric exploration of
potential drivers in a simple multivariate framework.
20Alternative forms of subsidization would be far superior to the Riester scheme, which we show in Appendix A.4.
There we equally distribute the whole subsidy volume only among the participating population. The results
indicate that the demogrant still achieves more progressive outcomes than the Riester scheme, even though
everyone in the population already receives subsidies under Riester.
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We model the participation decision, Ci with Ci ∈ {0, 1} (i indexes the household), by means
of a logit model. The model builds on the form,
P (Ci = 1|Xi) = Λ (α+ γ ×Xi + i) , (4)
where Λ is the logistic cumulative density function, Xi is a set of control variables, and  is the
error term.
Our first variable of interest for explaining participation is net income. Higher household income
is expected to bring about a higher saving propensity and, hence, make it easier to surmount the
hurdle of the 4% personal saving effort for full direct funding according to the Riester scheme.
Furthermore, higher income implies a higher marginal tax rate and, hence, a larger benefit from
tax deductions. Therefore, we expect income to be a key driver of participation in the Riester
scheme. This expectation is borne out by the estimation, as shown by the first row of Table 5.21
The coefficient on log income carries a positive sign and is strongly significant in all specifications.
When controlling for the age group, we find that people in the highest age bracket (56-64) are
significantly less likely to participate in the Riester scheme. This can be explained by the fact
that those individuals were relatively old when the Riester scheme was introduced – in 2002 –
and had little to gain from entering the program because their accumulation period was short.
The presence of children in the household increases the probability to participate in the Riester
scheme – something that is expected in light of its generous child allowance. Neither the gender
of the household head nor the location of the household in the western or the eastern part of
Germany significantly affect the probability of benefiting from the Riester scheme.
In addition to the previously mentioned covariates, Specification (2) of Table 5 includes dummies
for the educational attainment of the household head. A priori, it is unclear how education should
affect participation. While the better educated are more likely to diversify their portfolios and
to be aware of the specific benefits offered by Riester scheme, it is also possible that the less
educated are more easily taking up Riester contracts because they were heavily advertised. As it
turns out, the coefficients of the education dummies are insignificant, meaning that we cannot
reach any clear-cut conclusion.
Finally, Specification (3) adds a dummy for households that belong to the top quintile of the
wealth distribution. The coefficient of the dummy is strongly significant and positive.22 Its
marginal effect at sample means is 0.122 (S.E.: 0.043). With other covariates at their means,
belonging to top quintile of the net wealth distribution raises the probability of participating in
the Riester scheme from 26% to 38%.23
21We also run specifications with income-decile dummies. After testing, we determine that there is only a significant
difference in trend between the third and fourth decile, while all higher deciles (4-10) appear to have the same
effect.
22We have tested down from the full set of net wealth decile dummies. We could not reject that all other dummies
are jointly zero and a further test could not reject the equivalence of the coefficients for deciles 9 and 10.
Results are available upon request.
23Due to the complex survey design and multiple imputation, assessing goodness of fit is non-standard. McFadden’s
R2 is unavailable, making us resort to Efron’s R2, which is not based on the log-likelihood. Efron’s R2 is
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Table 5. Logit Models of Participation
Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3)
log of equivalent net income 0.5778*** 0.5419*** 0.4679***
(0.1347) (0.1429) (0.1430)
age: 36-45 -0.2373 -0.2140 -0.2340
(0.1955) (0.1951) (0.1954)
age: 46-55 -0.3157 -0.2978 -0.3355
(0.2084) (0.2091) (0.2103)
age: 56-64 -1.2090*** -1.1800*** -1.2930***
(0.2229) (0.2244) (0.2336)
single w/ children 0.5783 0.6016* 0.5886*
(0.3525) (0.3492) (0.3470)
couples 0.0672 0.0938 0.0807
(0.2229) (0.2229) (0.2226)
couples w/ children 0.6289*** 0.6585*** 0.6561***
(0.2091) (0.2130) (0.2115)
more than two adults 0.2943 0.3774 0.3194
(0.2654) (0.2635) (0.2650)
female 0.1004 0.0802 0.0774
(0.1683) (0.1705) (0.1730)
east 0.1700 0.2031 0.2337
(0.1989) (0.2044) (0.2074)
sec. educ. completed 0.3011 0.2627
(0.1985) (0.1978)
tertiary educ. completed -0.2079 -0.2165
(0.2347) (0.2320)
top quintile of net wealth 0.6262***
(0.2230)
constant -7.0285*** -6.7657*** -6.0048***
(1.3835) (1.4415) (1.4400)
observations 2043 2043 2043
Efron’s R2 0.065 0.066 0.069
PHF 2010. Own Calculations. 1000 bootstrap replicate weights used to compute standard errors.
Standard errors in parentheses. (***) statistically significant at the 1%-level, (**) at the 5%-level,
(*) at the 10%-level. We report the average of Efron’s R2 over all imputations, which may not be
statistically appropriate when the statistic is not normally distributed.
calculated as





with yi the observed values, y¯ their average and pˆi the predicted probabilities from the model.
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6. Conclusion
The Riester scheme is the main tool used by the German government to subsidize retirement
saving. As suggested by previous empirical studies, the Riester scheme largely fails to generate
more savings. Rather, it generates windfall gains for a subset of the population. In this paper,
we empirically investigate the distributional impact of the Riester scheme. We estimate that
38% of the subsidy volume accrues to the top quintile of the income distribution, but only 7.3%
to the bottom quintile. The share of the population below the poverty line increases by nearly
one percentage point. Nevertheless, the Riester scheme is almost distributionally neutral with
respect to overall inequality measures like the Gini coefficient. Distributional neutrality results
from two mutually offsetting effects: a progressive one stemming from the subsidy schedule,
and a regressive one from voluntary participation. Participation is quite sparse in the lower
deciles of the distribution, but, due to the low incomes at the bottom of the distribution, relative
subsidization is high. In the upper part of the distribution participation is more widespread; yet,
due to the rapid rise of incomes, subsidy rates cannot keep pace and fall off. We also show that
uniformly redistributing the amount spent by the government on the Riester scheme by means of
a demogrant would generate a significantly more equal distribution of income.
A simple multivariate regression analysis of take-up behavior of Riester subsidies confirms its
correlation with the income of households, even when controlling for the presence of children in
the household – another significant driver of participation. On top of that, take-up behavior is
significantly explained by high household wealth: belonging to the top quintile of the distribution
of net household wealth increases the probability to participate in the Riester scheme by about
12 percentage points.
Our analysis focuses on the distribution of annual income and how the distribution is affected
by the Riester scheme. However, this program is also affects the distribution of long-term incomes,
which depends on the future pay-outs from Riester contracts and how they will be handled by the
tax-transfer system. In particular, the long-term distributional effects will depend on the extent
to which those pay-outs will be credited against old-age assistance for the poor. Extending the




Typical phenomena in survey data are unit and item non-response. The PHF exhibits a high unit
non-response rate and a low item non-response rate.24 Data on wealth and income is assessed as
highly reliable by the data providers, as respondents were willing to answer sensitive questions
concerning these items.
24See Kalckreuth, Eisele, et al. (2012) and Tiefensee and Grabka (2014).
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To deal with item non-response, the dataset was multiply imputed, both for discrete and
continuous variables.25 If a variable is missing, five values are imputed. Otherwise the observed
value is recorded in all imputations.
Multiple imputation entails that imputed values may differ across imputations. This is because
an imputed value is the prediction of a regression model specific to that variable. In each
imputation after the first, random noise is added to the prediction. This holds also for categorical
variables. Accordingly, as an example, a person’s status may be employed in one imputation
and unemployed in another. Further, the framework of the imputation is hierarchical, meaning
that the imputation of some variable depends on the imputed values of others. For example,
work status is imputed before employment earnings. Non-uniformity of imputed variables across
imputations complicates our analysis. For example, eligibility for Riester subsidies is determined
by the employment status, but the employment status need not be the same across imputations.
As a result, a household may appear as “eligible” in one imputation and “ineligible” in another.
In such cases, we follow the guidelines of Rubin (2004) and define the status as ineligible.
Our analysis of the multiply imputed dataset follows the statistical procedures outlined in








for any desired point estimate Q¯ and any within-imputation point estimate, Qˆr, with the number
of imputations r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The variance of the point estimate is the weighted sum of two components: the between-
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The estimate of the total variance is,







25See Zhu and Eisele (2013) for details.
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which will conform to the Student’s t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom,
Q¯−Q√
T







Since our samples are adequately large and item-nonresponse is generally low, making ν
adequately large, we can use the simplifying assumption of the t-distribution approximating the





A.2. Details on Tax Calculation
Taking into account the logic of the German income tax law, the simulation proceeds in the
following steps:
1 Calculating the sum of incomes.
2 Deducting allowances and calculating the taxable income.
3 Implementing progression reservation.
4 Calculating the tax.
5 Testing the higher yield of child allowance and adjusting tax liability.
6 Testing the higher yield of the Riester allowance and adjusting tax liability.
7 Calculating the withholding capital tax.
8 Calculating the solidarity tax.
9 Calculating net income.
10 Aggregating to household level and adding transfers.
Due to the great overlap between the SOEP and the PHF, we can restrict ourselves to two
types of notable implementation differences concerning the tax calculation.
Omissions
Firstly, in calculating the sum of incomes (point 1), we collect all incomes relevant for the
calculation of the tax base. Here we are incapable of performing loss-compensation26, since
negative incomes have not been recorded. This is also generally the case for the STSM, but in
the PHF operating costs from rent and lease have also not been recorded. Therefore we cannot
deduct these costs from the rent and lease incomes. Secondly, due to lack of adequate information,
26A procedure that deducts losses - either across income sources or across periods - from earnings to lower the tax
base.
21
the calculation of the sum of incomes omits rents of widows and orphans. Thirdly, for the same
reason, we cannot deduct the Entfernungspauschale.27
Concerning the deduction of allowances (point 2), we are unable to implement the assessment
of child care costs28 as a special expense, since there is no data on this expense in the PHF.
Furthermore, we disregard progression reservation (point 3), as it is unlikely to affect individuals
relevant to our analysis.
Improvements
Concerning point 1, we impute Werbungskosten29 with aggregate statistics30 by grouping individ-
uals on income from dependent employment. Considering point 10, a feature of the PHF data
is its household-level variable on transfers. We simply add transfers to net or gross household
income and do not need to model them.
Otherwise the simulation follows exactly the scheme of the STSM tax calculation.
A.3. Sample 3: Participating Population
The third sample in use is the eligible population holding an active Riester contract, meaning at
least one actively contributing person in the household, see Table A1. Compared to the previous
samples, these households receive considerably higher average income. The average number of
household members and married household heads is also higher. The level of the Riester subsidy is
sizably larger than in the other samples, about 413.60e on average. About 53% of the households
in the participating population benefit from the tax deduction associated with the Riester scheme.
A.4. Targeted Demogrant
We only consider the participating population and redistribute the entire subsidy volume among
this particular group. The amount of the equivalent demogrant rises to 239.85e. Call this new
distribution the targeted demogrant. With it we reveal, whether the mechanisms of subsidization,
meaning allowances and tax deduction, have a progressive or regressive effect, since in this scenario
we do not redistribute to a broader sample and only the intensity of the subsidization counts.
Results are presented in Table A2.
The reaction of the inequality measures is again unanimous: all indicate greater inequality due
to the Riester scheme. Considering the effect sizes seen before, these are also relatively large.
The results also show an increase in the incidence of poverty and the Sen Index, while the IGR
shows a negative change due to the Riester scheme. The changes in absolute value are very small
in comparison to those seen before, yet it is still clear that a more favorable distribution of the
subsidy for the poor is reached by the targeted demogrant. From these results we can determine
that the form of subsidization chosen in the Riester scheme is still being outperformed by a
27A deduction of costs arising from commutes to one’s workplace.
28See § 10 S. 1 Nr. 5 EStG.
29A deduction of costs that derive from expenses to maintain earnings. See § 9 EStG.
30Statistisches Bundesamt (2008), also with data from 2009 and 2010, which came from a special report on request.
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Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for the Participating Population
mean std. error min max obs.
equivalent gross household income with trans-
fers without Riester subsidy
34844 1209 1133 324800 628
equivalent net household income with transfers
without Riester subsidy
29721 855.418 600 221772 628
number of household members 2.738 0.062 1 7 628
married 0.600 0.026 0 1 628
age 41.26 0.504 18 90 628
female 0.282 0.023 0 1 628
completed vocational training 0.554 0.025 0 1 628
completed extended vocational training 0.208 0.025 0 1 628
completed university degree 0.168 0.020 0 1 628
access to tertiary education 0.388 0.025 0 1 628
Estimated subsidies and subsidy rates
level of Riester subsidy 413.593 15.427 0 1764 628
ratio of subsidy to net household income in % 1.082 0.080 0 17.111 628
receiving Riester tax allowance 0.534 0.029 0 1 628
Note. PHF 2010. Own calculations. 1,000 bootstrap replicate weights used to compute standard errors.
Table A2. Inequality and Poverty Measures with Targeted Demogrant in the
Participating Population
wD wD − wR
low CI Point upp CI low CI Point upp CI
Gini 27.124 28.184 29.244 -0.113 -0.097 -0.082
MLD 12.773 14.030 15.288 -0.172 -0.141 -0.109
Theil 12.422 13.597 14.772 -0.110 -0.094 -0.077
GE2 13.079 15.935 18.791 -0.148 -0.119 -0.090
HCR 4.725 5.459 6.194 -0.099 -0.099 -0.099
IGR 19.928 27.993 36.058 -0.198 0.100 0.397
Sen 1.698 2.216 2.733 -0.063 0.039 -0.014
Note. PHF 2013. Own calculations. 95% confidence intervals are shown for
each statistic. 1,000 bootstrap replicate weights used to compute standard
errors. The measures Gini, MLD, Theil, GE2 and Sen were multiplied by
100. The HCR and IGR have been left as originally computed. wD indicates
the distribution with demogrant, wR the distribution with Riester induced
transfers.
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Figure A1. Participation Fraction by Decile in the Overall Population
Note. For each decile of the distribution, three statistics are provided: the point estimate of the participation rate
together with the upper and lower bound of the 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Much like the average subsidy level,
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Figure A2. Subsidy Rate by Decile of the Overall Population
Note.We define the subsidy rate as the sum of the subsidies divided by the sum of the incomes over all households in
each decile, multiplied by 100. In that sense, we do not compute an average of the subsidy rates, but rather the subsidy
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